China & Tibet

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China & Tibet. Please put on top! Thanks! 来源: riddlepc 于 08-04-09 21:12:15 [档案] [博客] [旧帖] [转至博客] [给我悄悄话]

After some discussions with some Americans, I found some have deep misunderstanding on China Tibet issue. When I tell them something different from what they think, sometimes some of them told me "you are brainwashed by the Chinese government." even though I am actually right.

So I read some writings done by independent Western researchers for 3 reasons, 1. Majority westerners just simply don't believe whatever the Chinese government says, in order to have a productive discussion with them, I have to use materails not from the Chinese government. 2. educate myself more with reseach findings. 3. use the knowledge I learned to spread the truths to as many as I can to help people to form a more objective opinion.

After I did some research, it took me several late nights to organize the following material which I sent to all my American friends in the hope to help them to get a more objective view.
I am posting the following online for people to forward to your Westerner friends who may have some misunderstanding on China Tibet issue to use as a reference when make a judgment on this important current affair. If you want to know what Western researchers' findings on Tibet issue, please read this yourself as well.

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After the long exchange about China and Tibet on this list, I thought it would be helpful to provide some neutral context. Because it bothers me very much that there is so much misunderstanding in the West about Chinese history, I've summarized information from a few sources on Tibet which are not related to the Chinese government or the Dalai Lama in the hopes that these might help paint a more complete picture of the situation in Tibet. What follows is admittedly a bit long. I've tried to summarize the key points as quickly as possible, but I encourage you to at least to skim what follows. I've deliberately included material from several different sources, occasionally with some repetitive content, so that you'll see that I haven't chosen to focus on one lone source which might be dismissed as just an eccentric who happens to support my views - and that I'm trying to disguise this in the cloak of a neutral perspective. For the record, there is no material from the Chinese government in this post: everything I reference here was done by independent English-speaking researchers and journalists.

The key issue at stake in Tibet is that of sovereignty. At what point is a group of people which makes up a political unit truly "independent"? (Consider the U.S. Civil War, for example.) In Tibet 's case, it ceased to be independent with the arrival of Ghengis Khan - but after the collapse of the Chinese Empire in 1912, subsequent Japanese invasion during World War II in 1937, and following the Chinese civil war of 1945-1949, Tibet governed itself. However, during that time, no foreign government officially recognized Tibet 's "independence": India , the UK , and the US all considered Tibet to be part of China . The Dalai Lama's view is that this ~35 year period of de facto independence justified Tibet 's continued existence as an independent nation. Both Chinese governments, in Beijing and Taipei , never gave up sovereignty over Tibet and Mao settled the question with force of arms in the 1950s. Complicating the issue is that the Tibetan population lives in four majority-Han Chinese provinces bordering Tibet as well and the Dalai Lama wants to include them in his ideal of an independent Tibetan nation. This sort of issue is a familiar cause of trouble around the world: it served as a pretext for Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia (to 'liberate' the ethnic Germans living in the Sudetenland) and we see it in present-day Turkey , Iraq , and Iran in the form of the Kurdish People's Party. Had the Western expansion not decimated their populations through warfare and other means, similar problems would exist in the US itself in the form of Native Americans, in Australia in the form of Aborigines, and elsewhere around the world. A fundamental question to ask is: what makes the Tibetans different from the Kurds, Sudeten Germans, Native Americans, Aborigines, etc. who find themselves a cultural minority in a larger nation?

The Tibetan issue is by no means clear-cut. It is complex, and in constant states of flux. Even Tibetan specialists find it difficult to fit together images and realities, and so one might imagine how much more difficult it is for the great majority who make no pretense to knowledge about Tibet and who, if interested, seek guidance in the formulation of their own images. Those who seek such guidance from the plethora of publications produced by the numerous existing Tibetan support groups or produced by the Chinese government should therefore read them with some considerable caution, given their obvious biases.

The Snow Lion and the Dragon

I read "The Snow Lion and the Dragon - China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama" by Melvyn C. Goldstein, as well as several other research articles on Tibet by some independent academic researchers. Almost all of what follows in quotation marks (most of the time followed by a page number) is from the book and the rest of the quotes are from academic researchers who I feel present objective, balanced views that are based on empirically verifiable research data of both a quantitative and qualitative nature. The references other than the ones from the book are either indexed at the end of this post or noted with the author's name and publication title in the text.
About the author: Melvyn Goldstein, a university anthropology professor, has published more than 80 articles and books on Tibet, speaks Tibetan fluently (not Chinese), lived in Tibet for years while doing research on Tibet, interviewed Chinese and Tibetan exile government officials, and sympathizes with Dalai Lama.

The Imperial Era

Political contact between China and Tibet started in the 7th century A.D. To maintain a friendly relationship between China and Tibet , the Chinese emperor married a princess to the Tibetan King, Songtsen Gampo. The story of the Chinese princess leaving China for Tibet is well-known in China - in Chinese, its title is "Zhao Jun Chu Sai".

"Genghis Khan conquered Tibet in 1207 and his grandson, Kublai Khan, conquered China in 1279 and founded the Yuan Dynasty" with its capital in today's Beijing . For the first time, both Tibet and China were under the rule of the same emperor. "Contemporary Chinese scholars and officials consider this the period when Tibet first became part of China ."

When Tibet became part of China in the thirteenth century, the Geluk, or Yellow Hat, sect of the Dalai Lama had not yet come into existence. Tibet was controlled by Red Hat Buddhists. In the late fourteenth century, a monk named Tsongkapa formed the Geluk. Tsongkapa's disciple, Gendundrup, became the first Dalai Lama. In the following more than two hundred years, the fighting between the Yellow Hat and Red Hat was full of violence and bloodshed. It ended with the Yellow Hat's victory by executing the Red Hat's leader Shigatse in 1642. Since then, the Dalai Lama's sect Geluk has been dominant in Tibet .

In 1644, the Qing Dynasty was formed in China , and " Tibet was ruled in a subordinate relationship to the Qing dynasty." Because of civil wars in Tibet among different ministers struggling for power, the Qing Emperor imposed reforms to stabilize Tibet and reduced its territory by placing some large ethnic Tibetan areas under the jurisdiction of Sichuan , Yunnan , and Qinghai provinces in 1724 and 1728. The division of Tibet produced distinct concepts of political Tibet and ethnographic Tibet . Ethnographic Tibet includes present-day political Tibet and the large ethnic Tibetan areas in the neighboring provinces.

Interlude - Tibet 's de facto independence

In 1912, the last emperor of China - the six year old emperor Puyi - abdicated, and the new Chinese republic headed by Yuan Shi Kai issued an edict that declared Tibet , Mongolia , and Xingjiang to be on equal footing with the provinces of China proper and "integral parts of the republic". In 1913, the thirteenth Dalai Lama told Yuan Shi Kai he "intended to exercise both temporal and ecclesiastic rule in Tibet ."

At that time, "the Tibet Question in its modern incarnation [was] born."

"Given the conflicting national aspirations, Tibet clearly had to reach some accommodation with China regarding its political status or be prepared to defend its territory. It turned out to be unable to do the former and unwilling to take the steps needed to do the latter."

Young Tibetan aristocratic officials urged modernization in Tibet , but key conservative officials campaigned to convince the Dalai Lama that modernization was a threat to Buddhism as well as to his own power and authority. Tibetan attempts to modernize failed.

In 1933, Chiang Kai Shek of the National Party opened an office in Lhasa . In 1937 the Japanese invasion of China left China no other choice but to let Tibet operate without Chiang's interference. However, China reinforced its position throughout the world ( and in China itself ) with a media campaign that actively sought to confirm the impression that Tibet was a part of China . From 1913 to 1949, because China fought one war after another, Tibet operated as a de facto independent entity in many ways, but " Britain and India (later the United States ) continued to acknowledge de jure Chinese suzerainty over Tibet . That is, they considered Tibet part of China ."

Mao Era

After Mao Zedong defeated Chiang Kai Shek and inaugurated the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China 's national policy held that China would be an indivisible multiethnic state with autonomous regions (rather than republics) that had no right to secede. Tibet is considered such a region in China and its own government had to be integrated into China . (p 41)

Threatened by the Chinese army, the Tibetan government sent appeals to the UN, the US , India , and the UK for civil and military assistance but were denied any help. "Mao had an excellent sense of history and believed that China 's best strategy was to liberate Tibet peacefully; that is, with the agreement of the government of Tibet ." After only token military resistance, the Tibetan government reluctantly signed the "Seventeen-Point agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet". (p 42-46)

This agreement acknowledged Chinese sovereignty. In exchange, China agreed to maintain the Dalai Lama and the traditional political-economic system until such time as the Tibetans wanted reforms.

In the heyday of the Cold War, Chinese aggression in Tibet provided a new opportunity and Washington jumped at it: the US would commit to providing light arms through India .

"In the years immediately following the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, Mao Zedong, contrary to popular belief in the West, pursued a policy of moderation in Tibet ." "The PLA troops and officials in Tibet emphasized that they had to come to help improve conditions in Tibet , not exploit and abuse it, and took care to show respect for Tibetan culture and religion. " (p 52)

The feudal system was unchanged in Tibet . However, the situation in ethnographic Tibet was very different because these Tibetans were not part of political Tibet (or the Seventeen-Point Agreement). "In late 1955 Li Jingquan authorized the start of democratic reforms throughout Sichuan province, including minority areas. This quickly led to a bloody rebellion in Tibetan areas, which spilled over into political Tibet as refugees ( and rebels ) from ethnographic Tibet fled to the safety of Lhasa and its environs. They became a major factor precipitating the 1959 uprising in Lhasa ." (page 53).

Before I continue on this topic, I have to add some additional information not detailed in the book which I think is an important part of Tibetan history that should not be omitted.
What was the society of Tibet at that time? The following is an excerpt from Michael Parenti's "Tibet Myth".

The Dalai Lama himself stated that "the pervasive influence of Buddhism" in Tibet , "amid the wide open spaces of an unspoiled environment resulted in a society dedicated to peace and harmony. We enjoyed freedom and contentment." (1).

A reading of Tibet 's history suggests a somewhat different picture. "Religious conflict was commonplace in old Tibet ," writes one western Buddhist practitioner. "History belies the Shangri-La image of Tibetan lamas and their followers living together in mutual tolerance and nonviolent goodwill. Indeed, the situation was quite different. Old Tibet was much more like Europe during the religious wars of the Counterreformation." (2)

Religions have had a close relationship not only with violence but with economic exploitation. Such was the case with the Tibetan theocracy. Until 1959, when the Dalai Lama last presided over Tibet , most of the arable land was still organized into manorial estates worked by serfs. These estates were owned by two social groups: the rich secular landlords and the rich theocratic lamas. Even a writer sympathetic to the old order allows that "a great deal of real estate belonged to the monasteries, and most of them amassed great riches." Much of the wealth was accumulated "through active participation in trade, commerce, and money lending." (3) The Dalai Lama himself "lived richly in the 1000-room, 14-story Potala Palace ." (4)

Old Tibet has been misrepresented by some Western admirers as "a nation that required no police force because its people voluntarily observed the laws of karma." (6) In fact. it had a professional army, albeit a small one, that served mainly as a gendarmerie for the landlords to keep order, protect their property, and hunt down runaway serfs.

Young Tibetan boys were regularly taken from their peasant families and brought into the monasteries to be trained as monks. Once there, they were bonded for life. Tashì-Tsering, a monk, reports that it was common for peasant children to be sexually mistreated in the monasteries. He himself was a victim of repeated rape, beginning at age nine. (7)

In old Tibet there were small numbers of farmers who subsisted as a kind of free peasantry, and perhaps an additional 10,000 people who composed the "middle-class" families of merchants, shopkeepers, and small traders. Thousands of others were beggars. There also were slaves, usually domestic servants, who owned nothing. Their offspring were born into slavery. (8) The majority of the rural population were serfs. Treated little better than slaves, the serfs went without schooling or medical care, They were under a lifetime bond to work the lord's land--or the monastery's land--without pay, to repair the lord's houses, transport his crops, and collect his firewood. They were also expected to provide carrying animals and transportation on demand.(9) Their masters told them what crops to grow and what animals to raise. They could not get married without the consent of their lord or lama. And they might easily be separated from their families should their owners lease them out to work in a distant location. (10)

"Pretty serf girls were usually taken by the owner as house servants and used as he wished"; they "were just slaves without rights."(11) Serfs needed permission to go anywhere. Landowners had legal authority to capture those who tried to flee. One 24-year old runaway welcomed the Chinese intervention as a "liberation." He testified that under serfdom he was subjected to incessant toil, hunger, and cold. After his third failed escape, he was merciless beaten by the landlord's men until blood poured from his nose and mouth. They then poured alcohol and caustic soda on his wounds to increase the pain, he claimed.(12)

The serfs were taxed upon getting married, taxed for the birth of each child and for every death in the family. They were taxed for planting a tree in their yard and for keeping animals. They were taxed for religious festivals and for public dancing and drumming, for being sent to prison and upon being released. Those who could not find work were taxed for being unemployed, and if they traveled to another village in search of work, they paid a passage tax. When people could not pay, the monasteries lent them money at 20 to 50 percent interest. Some debts were handed down from father to son to grandson. Debtors who could not meet their obligations risked being cast into slavery.(13)

The theocracy's religious teachings buttressed its class order. The poor and afflicted were taught that they had brought their troubles upon themselves because of their wicked ways in previous lives. Hence they had to accept the misery of their present existence as a karmic atonement and in anticipation that their lot would improve in their next lifetime. The rich and powerful treated their good fortune as a reward for, and tangible evidence of, virtue in past and present lives.

The Tibetan serfs were something more than superstitious victims, blind to their own oppression. As we have seen, some ran away; others openly resisted, sometimes suffering dire consequences. In feudal Tibet , torture and mutilation--including eye gouging, the pulling out of tongues, hamstringing, and amputation--were favored punishments inflicted upon thieves, and runaway or resistant serfs. Journeying through Tibet in the 1960s, Stuart and Roma Gelder interviewed a former serf, Tsereh Wang Tuei, who had stolen two sheep belonging to a monastery. For this he had both his eyes gouged out and his hand mutilated beyond use. He explains that he no longer is a Buddhist: "When a holy lama told them to blind me I thought there was no good in religion."(14) Since it was against Buddhist teachings to take human life, some offenders were severely lashed and then "left to God" in the freezing night to die. "The parallels between Tibet and medieval Europe are striking," concludes Tom Grunfeld in his book on Tibet.(15)

In 1959, Anna Louise Strong visited an exhibition of torture equipment that had been used by the Tibetan overlords. There were handcuffs of all sizes, including small ones for children, and instruments for cutting off noses and ears, gouging out eyes, breaking off hands, and hamstringing legs. There were hot brands, whips, and special implements for disemboweling. The exhibition presented photographs and testimonies of victims who had been blinded or crippled or suffered amputations for thievery. There was the shepherd whose master owed him a reimbursement in yuan and wheat but refused to pay. So he took one of the master's cows; for this he had his hands severed. Another herdsman, who opposed having his wife taken from him by his lord, had his hands broken off. There were pictures of Communist activists with noses and upper lips cut off, and a woman who was raped and then had her nose sliced away.(16)

Earlier visitors to Tibet commented on the theocratic despotism. In 1895, an Englishman, Dr. A. L. Waddell, wrote that the populace was under the "intolerable tyranny of monks" and the devil superstitions they had fashioned to terrorize the people. In 1904 Perceval Landon described the Dalai Lama's rule as "an engine of oppression." At about that time, another English traveler, Captain W.F.T. O'Connor, observed that "the great landowners and the priests... exercise each in their own dominion a despotic power from which there is no appeal," while the people are "oppressed by the most monstrous growth of monasticism and priest-craft." Tibetan rulers "invented degrading legends and stimulated a spirit of superstition" among the common people. In 1937, another visitor, Spencer Chapman, wrote, "The Lamaist monk does not spend his time in ministering to the people or educating them. . . . The beggar beside the road is nothing to the monk. Knowledge is the jealously guarded prerogative of the monasteries and is used to increase their influence and wealth." (17) As much as we might wish otherwise, feudal theocratic Tibet was a far cry from the romanticized Shangri La so enthusiastically nurtured by Buddhism's western proselytes.

Based on this deion of "civilization" in Tibet , it should come as no surprise that this social system came into conflict with Mao Zedong's socialist ideals.

When the communist party's land reform program was put in place in provinces bordering Tibet which had a heavily ethnic Tibetan population in 1955-1956, the Tibetan lords and lamas there rebelled, lost, and fled to political Tibet as refugees.

1959 Uprising

"By the mid-1950's the situation inside Tibet began to deteriorate. Chinese hardliners were pushing to begin "socialist transformation" reforms in Tibet proper, and Tibetan hardliners in league with refugees from the failed uprising in ethnographic Tibet were organizing an armed rebellion. Moreover, the United States was encouraging the anti-Chinese faction and in 1957 actually started to train and arm Tibetan guerrillas. Mao Zedong made a last attempt to salvage his gradualist policy in 1957 when he reduced the number of Han cadre and troops in Tibet and promised the Dalai Lama in writing that China would not implement socialist land reforms in political Tibet for the next six years. Furthermore, at the end of that period, Mao stated that he would postpone reforms again if conditions were not ripe." (page 54)

In 1959 an uprising broke out in Lhasa . "Many lamas and lay members of the elite and much of the Tibetan army joined the uprising, but in the main the populace did not, assuring its failure," writes Hugh Deane. (18) In their book on Tibet, Ginsburg and Mathos reach a similar conclusion: "As far as can be ascertained, the great bulk of the common people of Lhasa and of the adjoining countryside failed to join in the fighting against the Chinese both when it first began and as it progressed."(19) Eventually the resistance crumbled with the Dalai Lama's flight into exile in India .

Despite deep involvement in training and funding a large Tibetan guerrilla operation at the time, the US was unwilling to provide support for Tibet 's independent status. (page 57) The CIA's support of the Dalai Lama gradually stopped after Nixon and Kissinger visited China , and the Tibetan topic was not mentioned any more in the US . (page 58)

In the early 1960s, Tibet , like the rest of China , suffered during "The Great Leap Forward", then from 1966 - 1976, during the "Cultural Revolution". (Page 60)

Post-Mao Era

After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping came into power and invited the Dalai Lama's exile government to visit Tibet . The Chinese government exhorted the local Tibetan "masses" not to let their hatred of the "old society" provoke them to throw stones or spit at the Dalai Lama's delegates who were coming as guests of the Chinese government before the Dalai Lama's delegate's arrival - but when the Dalai Lama's delegate arrived, thousands of Tibetans gave a warm welcome surpassing everyone's expectation. (p 62) The overall impact of the delegations was precisely the opposite of what Beijing had hoped: it bolstered the confidence of the exiles at a difficult time in their history. (p 63)

In 1980, Party Secretary Hu Yaobang announced a liberal six-point reform program for Tibet : (page 65) 1) Enact laws to protect the right of Tibet 's national autonomy and its special national interests; 2) Exempt Tibet from taxes and exactions; 3) Enact flexible policies promoting Tibet 's economic development more rapidly; 4) Make vigorous efforts to revive and develop Tibetan culture, education and science, 5) Cadres of Han Chinese working in Tibet will be required to learn the spoken and written Tibetan language. 6) Full time cadres of Tibetan nationality should account for more than 2/3rds of all government functionaries in Xizang [ Tibet ], within the next 2-3 years.

Beijing was clearly interested in persuading the Dalai Lama to return to China and invited the Dalai Lama to negotiate in 1982. (p 69) However, it's a difficult problem for the Dalai Lama. "For two decades the Tibetan government-in-exile's rhetoric had adamantly articulated Tibet 's right to complete independence and had depicted the Chinese Communists as bestial, untrustworthy oppressors without a shred of humanity or honesty. Suddenly appearing willing to return to live under a Chinese Communist government, therefore, could easily undermine the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama and the exile government among the refugee community. " (p 70).

"Complicating this was the future status of "ethnographic Tibet ." The exile government was deeply committed to the re-creation of a "Greater" Tibet , which would include in one administrative unit both political and ethnographic Tibet ... because of the large numbers of Tibetans from those ethnic areas...However, the goal of a Greater Tibet was not at all politically realistic. Tibet had not ruled most of these areas for a century or more (since 1728), and it is difficult to see how China could have handed over large areas in Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan, many of which included Chinese and Chinese Muslim (Hui) populations that had migrated there well before the Communists came to power in 1949. However, if Dharamsala [the seat of Tibet 's government in exile, in India ] decided not to pursue a demand for a Greater Tibet, it would be breaking faith with the Eastern Tibetans in exile. Like the forsaking of independence, this issue was highly contentious and if it became known that the Dalai Lama was willing to consider it, the unity of the exile community could be permanently split. " (p 71)

"Despite the overwhelming power of China and the absence of Western governmental support for Tibetan independence, [the Tibetan government in exile] felt that China could not solve the Tibet Question without them. ...to the Dalai Lama and his top officials in 1982 it was enough to tilt the balance in favor of holding fast and making no compromises. They in effect concluded that time was on their side. " They refused the negotiation request from Beijing . (p 72)

Beijing was disappointed, but was unwilling to cut off discussions with the Dalai Lama. "In 1984, the Dalai Lama's faction made its own substantive proposal that included creation of a demilitarized Greater Tibet with complete internal political autonomy. It was, of course, futile from the start. Beijing was not willing to discuss real political autonomy for Tibet . It was looking to enhance its stability and security in Tibet , not lessen it by turning over political control of Tibet to its 'enemies' in Dharamsala, let alone give them control over a Greater Tibet. In one sense, Dharamsala's leaders had misjudged both their own leverage and Beijing 's desire for an agreement; in another sense, they simply could not bring themselves to contemplate accepting anything less. They were angry and frustrated by Chinese intransigence...In this strained atmosphere a proposed visit of the Dalai Lama to China and Tibet fell by the wayside. " (p 74)

"Great strides had been made in permitting Tibetan culture and religion to flourish in a region that was still overwhelmingly Tibetan in demographic composition." "Material life had improved tremendously in both Lhasa and in the countryside. At the same time, China 's economic power and international prestige were increasing, a major goal of U.S. policy in Asia being to strengthen its strategic relationship with Beijing . Thus, there was now a real danger that the exile's role in the Tibet Question would be marginalized. " ( p 75)

"Dharamsala and the Dalai Lama responded in 1986-1987 by launching a new political offensive--what we can think of as their 'international campaign.'[13] It sought, on the one hand, to secure new Western political and economic leverage to force Beijing to offer the concessions they wanted, and on the other hand, to give Tibetans in Tibet the hope that the Dalai Lama was on the verge of securing Western assistance to settle the Tibet Question, in essence, shifting their attention from their stomachs to their ethnic hearts. " ( p 75)

"A campaign was launched to gain American support for the exile's cause, in essence, to redirect the significance of the Tibet Question from the arena of geopolitical national interests to the sphere of core U.S. values--to the U.S. ideological commitment to freedom and human rights. "
"On September 21, 1987, the Dalai Lama made his first political speech in America before the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus. He said, "though Tibetans lost their freedom, under international law Tibet today is still an independent state under illegal occupation." The speech also raised serious human rights charges, referring twice to a Chinese-inflicted "holocaust" on the Tibetan people. ( p 77)

Both the Dalai Lama and his advisor and youngest brother, Tendzin Choegyal, claimed that "more than 1.2 million Tibetans are dead as a result of the Chinese occupation." (20) The official 1953 census--six years before the 1959 uprising--recorded the entire population residing in Tibet at 1,274,000.(21). If the Chinese killed 1.2 million in the early 1960s then almost all of Tibet , would have been depopulated, transformed into a killing field dotted with death camps and mass graves--of which we have no evidence. The thinly distributed Chinese force in Tibet could not have rounded up, hunted down, and exterminated that many people even if it had spent all its time doing nothing else.

(My comment: in the 2000 Chinese census, there were 2.4 million Tibetans in political Tibet and 6 million Tibetans in ethnographic Tibet . If China killed 1.2 million in the early 1960s out of a population tallied at 1,274,000 in the census of 1953, it would be difficult indeed to achieve a population of 2.4 million barely 35 years later.

(David Curtis Wright, a history professor at the University of Calgary , wrote "A few years ago, a fairly prominent Tibetan called me from the United States and asked me to consider writing a book arguing that Tibet had always been a country independent from China . I replied that I could not do this because I do not quite see things this way.

First of all, the Mongols controlled Tibet during some periods of the Mongol empire, of which China was a part during the Yuan dynasty (A.D. 1279-1368). Secondly, beginning in the late 18th century Tibet was clearly and unambiguously under the military, political, and religious control of China 's Qing dynasty (1644-1912). Lastly, and most importantly, the modern concepts of statehood, independence, and sovereignty emerged in recent centuries in Europe and should not be anachronistically and uncritically applied to pre-modern East Asia .

Tibet had de facto independence after 1911, but both the Republic of China (1911-1949; now confined to the Chinese island of Taiwan ) and the People's Republic of China on the mainland (1949-present) regarded Tibet as historically Chinese territory that would one day be brought back under Chinese control. The PRC used military force to make good on these intentions in the 1950s, and in 1959 the Dalai Lama's government fled Tibet ." (22))

Even though the Dalai Lama didn't state the facts in his speech, "This speech was well received in the United States , and three weeks later, on October 6, the Senate passed its version of the earlier House bill regarding Tibet . Ultimately, on December 22, 1987, President Reagan signed the (1988-1989) Foreign Relations Authorization Act into law." "It was seen in Dharamsala as a major victory--as the start of a Congress-driven move to create a new U.S. foreign policy that would proactively seek settlement of the Tibet Question in a manner favorable to the Dalai Lama. From out of nowhere, therefore, the United States was again actively involved in the Tibet Question, albeit through Congress rather than the executive branch or the State Department. " (p 78)

Following the US 's support, demonstrations by monks to support the Dalai Lama and a series of riots happed in Tibet in late 80's.

"It is instructive to examine why the series of riots occurred if China was pursuing a moderate, ethnically sensitive reform policy. " (p 83)

"One factor underlying the Tibetans' attitude was how they interpreted U.S. events. Many average Tibetans in Lhasa believed that the Dalai Lama's speech to the Human Rights Caucus of Congress was a turning point in Tibetan history, and that the United States, in their eyes the world's greatest military power, would soon force China to "free" Tibet. " ( p 83)

"...program of economic development in Tibet... created a substantial economic ripple effect...the larger need in Tibet for skilled workers overwhelmed the Chinese government's attempts to stop Han and Muslim [Chinese from] moving to Tibet...Most Tibetans in Lhasa resented the increasing control of the Han in their local economy" (p 84)

"...a number of restrictions in areas such as the total number of monks remained...angered the monks and many laymen...restricting them made it easy for Tibetans in Lhasa to see the glass as half empty rather than half full..." ( p 85)

(Comment: I have heard, but could not find proof on the internet in an admittedly abbreviated search, that these monks have ranks and are paid a stipend accordingly by the Chinese government. If that's true, my advice to the Chinese government is to stop paying the monks and let their ranks grow as large as they like as long as they support themselves. )

The riots "share many similarities with the terrible racial riots the United States experienced in Watts and other inner-city neighborhoods, or the anger of Native Americans that exploded at Wounded Knee . " ( p 86)

"Building one more stadium, or road, or factory, or apartment building could no more eliminate that problem in Lhasa than it could in the U.S. ghettos. " ( p 87)

"New congressional support in the United States , coupled with the demonstrations and riots in Tibet , led the exiles to conclude that they were beginning to amass the critical leverage needed to pressure Beijing to yield to their demands for political autonomy. " (p 87)

"In 1988, the Chinese announced that if the Dalai Lama publicly gave up the goal of independence, he could live in Tibet (rather than Beijing ). Two months later, on June 15, 1988, the Dalai Lama responded to this announcement in an address to the European Parliament at Strasbourg...it did not represent anything new to the Chinese... Talks, therefore, did not occur." (p 87 - 89)

"The unexpected death on January 28, 1989, of Tibet's second highest incarnation--the Panchen Lama--produced a surprising secret initiative from Beijing...China had its Buddhist Association invite the Dalai Lama to Beijing to participate in the memorial ceremony for the Panchen Lama, letting it be known that this would be a good time for him to discuss the political situation informally with top Chinese officials...hard-line officials in Dharamsala feared that in face-to-face talks with top Chinese leaders the Dalai Lama might accept a less favorable compromise than they wanted...the Dalai Lama declined the invitation...Many look back at this as one of the most important lost opportunities in the post-1978 era. " ( p 90)

"In 1989, the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize..Tibetans...considered this a major victory... the Tiananmen debacle...fostered a more hard-line political policy in China " (p 91)

"Momentum appeared to have shifted to the Dalai Lama, whose international initiative had successfully turned the tables on China , placing Beijing on the defensive both in the world arena and within Tibet . Beijing reacted predictably to the threat this shift in momentum posed by moving to a more hard-line, integrationist policy...The new policy operated under the assumption that it was unrealistic to expect the Dalai Lama to play a constructive role in Tibet . Beijing would try to solve the Tibetan problem without him. " (P 91-92)

"The cornerstone of the central government's new policy was (and is) economic growth and modernization...for 10 percent economic growth per annum and a doubling of Tibet's 1993 gross domestic product by the year 2000...committed 2.38 billion yuan (about 270 million dollars) for sixty-two infrastructure construction projects at the 1994 meeting...A number of Tibetans have clearly benefited economically, and others are now turning their attention from politics to new economic opportunities." ( p 93)

"Non-Tibetans now control a large segment of all levels of the local economy...Tibetans believe they cannot compete economically with the more skilled and industrious Han and Hui...The large numbers of non-Tibetans living and working in Tibet provide Beijing a new and formidable pro-China "constituency" that increases its security there...One can easily imagine that if China's control over Tibet became seriously threatened by militant violence, not only would more troops be rushed in, but new laws could be promulgated to make the large Han presence permanent by offering attractive perks... " ( p 94-95)

China's leaders expects these Chinese "will open up Tibetans to new ideas and attitudes and create a new, "modern" Tibetan in the process who will not be so influenced by religion and lamas...while Beijing realizes that its open-door policy will likely create much pain and anguish among Tibetans in the short run, it feels that this is the price it must pay for modernizing Tibetan society, and that in the long run it will triumph..." ( p 96)

" Beijing has therefore turned the tables back on Dharamsala. The triumphs of the Dalai Lama's international campaign look more and more like pyrrhic victories. The international initiative won significant symbolic gains for the exiles in the West, but not only did it not compel China to yield to its demands, it played a major role in precipitating the new hard-line policy that is changing the nature of Tibet . Ironically, by threatening China's political hold over Tibet, Dharamsala and its Western supporters provided the advocates of a hard-line Tibet policy the leverage they needed to shift Beijing's Tibet policy away from the ethnically sensitive one advocated by Hu Yaobang in the early 1980s. " ( p 99)

The Future

"What of the future? How is this conflict likely to play out as we move into the twenty-first century? Is there any common ground on which to construct a reconciliation between the Dalai Lama and China ? Does the United States have a role to play? "

China

" Beijing now has little interest in new discussions with the Dalai Lama because it believes he still is not serious about making the kind of compromise China can accept." (p 100)

In the course of selecting a reincarnated new Penchan Lama in 1989, the Dalai Lama "embarrassed and infuriated the Chinese government...the Dalai Lama's decision to preemptively announce the new Panchen Lama was, to say the least, politically inastute...his announcement was seen in China as a hostile political act aimed at embarrassing China and an example of the Dalai Lama's relentless pursuit of political kudos in the West at China's expense. From China 's perspective, once again, at a critical time, the Dalai Lama had thumbed his nose at Beijing , sending a clear signal that when it got down to fishing or cutting bait, he still preferred cutting bait! " ( p 108)

"The Dalai Lama's announcement...placed China in a difficult predicament... While many in exile and in the West see this as a victory for the Dalai Lama, it is hard to understand their logic. To be sure, it made Tibetans and their Western supporters feel good to see the Dalai Lama exert his authority over this issue, but the price he paid was substantial and the gains were minuscule...The Dalai Lama knows intellectually that he needs more friends and supporters in Beijing, not Washington or New York City," but his actions "reinforced the hard-liners' contention that China cannot trust or work with the Dalai Lama ." ( p 109-110)

"Right now the hard-liners on Tibet are in control, and they will remain so unless something gives the more moderate elements in Beijing and Lhasa new leverage. That new leverage can only be provided by the Dalai Lama. " ( p 111)

The Dalai Lama and Dharamsala

" China appears categorically unwilling to give Tibet the right to a different political system--self-rule--and the Dalai Lama is unwilling to accept less than that. What is new, however, is China 's current hard-line policy, which is exerting tremendous pressure on the Dalai Lama and his leaders either to quickly resolve the conflict or to develop effective countermeasures that will prevent China from changing the ethnic and economic character of Tibet . " ( p 113)

Dalai Lama has several options (p 114 - 117):

"continue his current international campaign, trying to keep China on the defensive in the global arena through human rights attacks while striving to garner more support for his cause in Washington and Europe ...these international successes make everyone feel good but do not change the outcome of the contest."

"hope Communist China will soon disintegrate like the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the USSR in 1991...", however before that happens if that happens, Tibet would be transformed already.
"One direction would be serious compromise ... it would mean placing the interests of the 4 million Tibetans in Tibet ahead of the interests of the 130,000 Tibetans in exile."

"An alternative strategic option would be escalation--encouraging (or organizing) violent opposition in Tibet as a means of exerting new leverage for concessions from China . a campaign of terroristic violence ... Very likely such a strategy would be based outside of Tibet and carried out by small units of trained and dedicated militants...Without changing its entire open-door policy for tourists and businesspeople, Beijing could not prevent explosives from entering its major points of entry in Eastern China . "

"as the exiles become more and more impotent to change the situation in Tibet , their frustration will increase and the danger of serious violence will increase exponentially, with or without the Dalai Lama's approval."

US's role:

"The Dalai Lama's international initiative garnered strong sympathy and support for Tibet in Congress, in the human rights community, and among citizens' lobbying groups, and was able to move the Tibet issue from the rarefied atmosphere of professional "foreign affairs" to the more visceral arena of domestic U.S. politics."

"Congress took the lead, initiating a variety of measures in support of the Dalai Lama...The United States has also experienced an explosion of popular attention and support for the Dalai Lama and his cause...and the involvement of entertainment glitterati such as Harrison Ford, Richard Gere, Philip Glass, and the late Allen Ginsberg. The Dalai Lama himself has in some senses become a pop-culture icon. "

"the Clinton administration finds it impossible to totally ignore human rights issues because of the powerful China and Tibet lobby, and it has had to walk a careful line between speaking up for religious and civil freedoms in China (and therefore in Tibet) and taking actions that would seriously disrupt Sino-American relations. "

"U.S. involvement has not been simply harmless--it has had serious negative consequences, for America's token actions have led many Tibetans to believe that it supports the Dalai Lama's wish for democracy in Tibet and encouraged them to continue opposing China...Thus, the view of many in Beijing that the United States is "stirring up" Tibetans and threatening China's strategic interests in Tibet by trying to destabilize an important frontier region (as the CIA tried to do there in the 1950s and 1960s) is not without basis. "

"The Tibet Question has currently reached a dangerous turning point. The Chinese are pursuing a policy that the Dalai Lama knows is changing Tibet, perhaps irretrievably...The fourteenth Dalai Lama contemplating how to preserve a "Tibetan" Tibet for future generations of his people. He may continue to sit on the sidelines, hoping that external forces will destroy his enemy, but it is more likely that he will soon feel compelled to adopt a proactive approach--either moving to preserve Tibet by accepting a major compromise, or by tacitly and reluctantly accepting a new tactic of countering Chinese policies in Tibet through organized violence. "

Comments on Current Events
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After I studied these articles, I arrived at the conclusion that the Dalai Lama is not just a monk seeking spiritual enlightment, but also is a politician who wishes to fight to preserve Tibetan culture and language - however his unwarranted charges against the Chinese government damage his credibility. Because he misjudged his leverage at several important points and refuses to compromise his idea to rebuild Greater Tibet - which hasn't existed since 1728 -, his actions and "media victories" in Western countries basically pushed China 's hard-liners to dominate its Tibet policy, leading to a faster pace of modernization in political Tibet . With modernization and better education, religion gradually will play a less important role among Tibetans and the Dalai Lama's status as the highest ranking reincarnated Lama will have less and less influence on the Tibetan people. Also with modernization and economic development, Tibet will be tightly tied as a part of China 's economy and development will attract other ethnic groups, which in turn will change Tibet 's demography forever.

If he really is concerned about the 6 million Tibetans in China and not just the 130,000 Tibetans in exile, he needs to make some serious concessions and negotiate with China to help the moderates in China support his influence to work with the Chinese government and help 6 million Tibetans in China to preserve their culture, language, and live a better life.

Unfortunately, if you have been watching recent news about Tibet , you've seen a big riot in Lhasa on 3/14/08 and continuous protests (sometimes violent) along the Olympic Torch relay. This kind of strategy is not helping the Dalai Lama gain any support from the Chinese government - which is support he needs in order to achieve his goals. It does give Tibetan exiles more photo opportunities and more exposure in the Western media - which only makes China respond with a hard-line policy. What the protesters are doing also angers the majority of the Chinese people, who support the Chinese government's hard-line policy. The Dalai Lama has the opportunity to create peace, but unless he changes his tactics, sadly we will see more problems rather than less. As a politician, he has failed so far.

Since the Dalai Lama's tactics only encourage China to take a hard-line approach, I worry that the result will be a more extreme response, with an evolution in Tibet of something like the IRA.

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Some Human Rights Charges by Tibetan Exiles Against the Chinese Government:

It is not unusual to here protesters putting forth the idea that Tibetans were fiercely suppressed and Tibetan languages and culture is being destroyed. The following was written by an Australian teaching in China for five years in response to these charges:

Let us look at the evidence. If Tibetans were so fiercely suppressed, and if Chinese leaders in Beijing were really out to Sinocize Tibet by increasing the ethnic ratio of Han to Tibetan, then why are all Tibetan families permitted to have up to three children, and are only fined small amounts of money if they exceed this number? Tibetan families in Tibet average 3.8 children, larger than Tibetan families in India . In fact, the population of Tibet in 1959 was only about 1.19 million. Today however, the population of Greater Tibet is 7.3 million, of which, according to the 2000 census, 6 million are ethnic Tibetans. If we consider the Tibet Autonomous Region only, then according to the census conducted in 2000, as referred to in Wikipedia, "there were 2,616,300 people in Tibet , with Tibetans totalling 2,411,100 or 92.2% of the current regional population. The census also revealed that the Tibetan's average lifespan has increased to 68 due to the improving standard of living and access to medical services." In 1950 the average lifespan was only 35, and "infant mortality has dropped from 43% in 1950 to 0.661% in 2000."

As Barry Sautman, who is Associate Professor of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology points out in his study on " Tibet and the (Mis-)Representation of Cultural Genocide", "the state sponsored transfer [of Han Chinese] to Tibet is on a small scale. From 1994 to 2001 the PRC organized only a few thousand people to go to Tibet as cadres. Most serve only 3 years and then return to China . Those who move on their own to the Tibet Autonomous Region usually return to China in a few years. They come for a while, find the cities of Tibet too expensive, and then return to China . Some of the 72,000 Chinese who maintain their 'hukou' [household registration] in Tibet don't really live there. Pensions are higher if your household is registered in Tibet ."

These facts are supported by articles in the Columbia Journal of Asian Law and by an Australian Chinese demographer in Asian Ethnicity in 2000, and show that the claims of ethnic swamping in Tibet are misleading. "What I think these articles show," says Barry Sautman, "is that there is no evidence of significant population losses over the whole period from the 1950s to the present. There are some losses during he Great Leap Forward but these were less in Tibetan areas than in other parts of China . Where these were serious were in Sichuan and Qinghai , but even there not as serious in the Han areas of China . There are no bases at all for the figures used regularly by the exile groups. They use the figure of 1.2 million Tibetans dying from the 1950s to the 1970s, but no source for this is given. As a lawyer I give no credence to statistics for which there is no data, no visible basis."

Tibetans in exile and their supporters seem to pull such figures out of a hat in the same way that the Chinese exile Harry Wu does in relation to the number of mainland prisoners (see my piece On the Nature of Chinese Governance and Society for details).

Barry Sautman also convincingly challenges claims that the Tibetan language is being devalued and replaced by Chinese. "92-94% of ethnic Tibetans speak Tibetan," he notes. "Instruction in primary school is pretty universally in Tibetan. Chinese is bilingual from secondary school onward. All middle schools in the TAR also teach Tibetan. In Lhasa there are about equal time given to Chinese, Tibetan, and English."

There is also an upsurge of the performing arts, poetry and painting by Tibetans, which many visitors to Tibet today cannot fail to notice, all of which are encouraged and funded by Beijing, though of course the growing tourist market also plays an important role in encouraging Tibetans to continue practicing their traditional arts and crafts, albeit, in a commodified form.
Importantly, Sautman, like me, has observed surprisingly "few aspects of Chinese culture in Tibet , but there are many aspects of Western culture, such as jeans, disco music, etc."

Barry Sautman's views are by no means marginalized within Western academia either. Tony Colin Mackerras, Professor Emeritus of International Business and Asian Studies at Griffith University, Australia, for example, remarked that Suatman's book "is a courageous and long overdue study of a highly emotional and extremely important topic' in that it meticulously details and documents "the processes of cultural change in religion, the arts, language, migration and various other aspects" which are rightly attributed "mainly to Westernized modernity."

Another interesting and insightful study is the one carried out by Melvyn C. Goldstein, who is Professor and Chairman, Department of Anthropology, and Director of the Center for Research on Tibet at Case Western Reserve University , Cleveland , Ohio , and Cynthia M. Beall, who is Professor of Anthropology at Case Western Reserve University . Their study, titled "The Impact of China's Reform Policy on the Nomads of Western Tibet", was carried out over a 16 month period in the Tibet Autonomous Region, and was supported by grants from the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, the Committee on Research and Exploration of the National Geographic Society, and the National Science Foundation.

It's worth quoting at length from their conclusion:

"The new Chinese economic and cultural policies implemented in Tibet following Hu Yaobang's investigation tour in May of 1980 have produced a major transformation in Phala. Following decollectivisation, the nomads' economy immediately reverted to the traditional household system of production and management, which, enhanced by the concession on taxes, has led to an overall improvement in the standard of living even though local-level officials have not completely implemented an open (or negotiated) market system. The new policies have also led to increasing involvement in the market economy and dramatic social and economic differentiation. Equally important, the post-1980 policies have fostered a cultural and social revitalization that has allowed the nomads to resurrect basic components of their traditional culture....life in Phala today is closer to that of the traditional era than at any time since China assumed direct administrative control over Tibet in 1959. The post-1980 reforms created conditions whereby the nomadic pastoralists of Phala were able to regain control of their lives and recreate a matrix of values, norms, and beliefs that is psychologically and culturally meaningful. The new polices have, in essence, vindicated the nomads' belief in the worth of their nomadic way of life and their Tibetan ethnicity."

Tyler Denison reached similar conclusions in his study, titled "Reaffirmation of 'Ritual Cosmos': Tibetan Perceptions of Landscape and Socio-Economic Development in Southwest China", published quite recently in the Spring 2006 edition of the University of New Hampshire Undergraduate Research Journal .

"Rather than finding Tibetan tradition being destroyed by Chinese rule and the influx of people, goods and ideas from the modern world," concludes Denison , "I witnessed firsthand the importance of Kawa Karpo and the ritual cosmos in the lives of the Tibetans of Deqin county: it has not been diminished. Tibetans' enduring perception of the landscape as a ritual cosmos cannot be termed a static reality of tradition, but more a dynamic cultural process, as they are continually renegotiating and redefining their beliefs in light of new social and economic realities."

And by the way, most Tibetans, if you ever get a chance to visit Tibet and to converse with the Tibetan locals, will tell you that they are not "forced" to learn Chinese, but rather, do so keenly, and on the expectation that being fluent in both Chinese and English will help to empower themselves by broadening their future employment opportunities.

In fact, as Tsering Shakya has pointed out in a paper he wrote for the New Left Review in 2002, "Tibetans are indeed well represented on bodies like the National People's Congress and the People's Consultative Conference. In fact I would go further and say that they are over-represented, given the size of the Tibetan population." And don't forget the role that many Tibetans themselves played in the destruction of monasteries and the various persecutions that took place in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution. Let's not deny the people of Tibet of any agency.

Let us take attitudes towards the Beijing to Lhasa railway as evidence that Tibetans embrace Chinese investment in Tibet . In the lead-up to the opening of that railway, the Dalai Lama expressed fears that the railway was going to aid in the Sinocisation of Tibet, and this was quickly seized on by Tibetans in exile support groups throughout the Western world as a development that would aid in Beijing's alleged policy of genocide. Such claims of course, excited the imaginations of many ordinary Tibetans, many of who not surprisingly then expressed suspicions about what the new train line would bring them. But as many tourists and journalists to Tibet soon discovered, many urban ethnic Tibetans felt as though the positives would outweigh the negatives, and this is because an increasing number of Tibetans now have a very real material stake in the new economy. Their living standards are improving, and although Han retailers and small businesses stand to benefit more from increases in tourism and trade, the fact is that this will likely change as more and more Tibetans accumulate sufficient enough capital to start up enterprises of their own. And many Tibetans know this. Jonathon Watts, of The Guardian newspaper, reported that "Among the four or five unscheduled meetings I had with Tibetans, most were looking forward to the economic benefits the line is expected to bring: 2.5m tonnes of cargo and 1m tourists and business people."

Indeed, Tibetans are divided on the issue of whether or not the benefits of being a part of China outweigh the negatives. "Tibetans are divided," noted Jonathon Watts. There are those "independence activists" who expressed disapproval of the railway because they are against being a part of China , and who therefore regard the new line as evidence that Beijing is out to further entrench their rule, while others acknowledged the good that the trains might bring. "I was surprised to find a living Buddha make one of the strongest arguments in favour of the railway," wrote Watts . "'We've been too backward, too isolated for too long,' said the lama, who asked that his name not be used. 'The rest of the world is in the 21st century. We are still in the middle ages.' A more predictable advocate was the governor of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Jampa Pahtsok. "It is unimaginable to have a high growth rate without a railroad.'" (see The Guardian, Sep.20, 2005)

And life is improving for many Tibetan farmers also, as Goldstein and Beall's research (mentioned earlier) shows. When Dexter Roberts came across villagers in Northern Tibet's Nagqu Prefecture , he discovered that most of the villagers (barley farmers and herdsmen) were quite content. "Life isn't bad at all", he quoted one villager as saying. (see " Tibet : Caught in China 's Two Hands", Business Week Online, Sep.19, 2003).

It may well be unreasonable to argue that most Tibetans don't want some form of self-government. But it likely is presumptuous to say that the majority of Tibetans want independence. Maybe they do. But to assert with confidence that most want independence without supporting such a claim with any empirically verifiable evidence of a quantitative nature is questionable, especially when there is a growing amount of qualitative evidence to show that Tibetans are divided on such issues. Even the Dalai Lama himself says that he no longer wants total independence from China , but instead, some form of self-government.

Take a closer, more objective look at Tibet today. The mass protests have stopped. As Robert Barnett, author of " Lhasa : Streets with Memories" (published by Columbia University Press) stated in an interview back in April 2006, " Tibet has become a dispute in which the main weapons are forms of economic change that have benefits and drawbacks: the market, the leisure industry, mass tourism, population shift, uneven wealth, and consumerism."
It won't be all that much longer before Lhasa's main thoroughfares find themselves hosting McDonald's, KFC, and Pizza Hut fast food outlets, along with Starbuck's and other such global enterprises. And don't be too surprised if some of the license holders turn out to be ethnic Tibetans.

Some argue that " Tibet and Tibetans might [have] been very different had China not invaded, but for sure they would be sovereign masters of their own destiny." In response, consider how many ordinary Tibetans were ever the "masters of their own destinies". That's not intended to justify China 's invasion and occupation of Tibet , which was carried out for geopolitical reasons and largely in response to continual incursions by Britain and Russia - and which therefore needs to be viewed in the context of the Cold War. The Kuomintang of course consistently made it clear that they intended on invading and occupying Tibet, and had they defeated the PLA, they probably would have gone on to do just that. Had that been the case, I bet the U.S. State Department wouldn't have objected.

But let us not romanticize the life of Tibetans prior to the invasion either. As Michael Parenti (and many others like Leigh Feigon, in his book "Demystifying Tibet" has documented, Tibet "was a retrograde theocracy of serfdom and poverty, where a favoured few lived high and mighty off the blood, sweat, and tears of the many. It was a long way from Shangri-La."

And "whatever wrongs and new oppressions introduced by the Chinese in Tibet , after 1959 they did abolish slavery and the serfdom system of unpaid labour, and put an end to floggings, mutilations, and amputations as a form of criminal punishment. They eliminated the many crushing taxes, started work projects, and greatly reduced unemployment and beggary. They established secular education, thereby breaking the educational monopoly of the monasteries. And they constructed running water and electrical systems in Lhasa ."

Finally, we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that the Tibetans in exile and their supporters have consistently exaggerated the human rights abuses that have taken place in Tibet , as Barry Sautman and others have convincingly demonstrated. Such exaggerations from the Tibetan community in exile come as no surprise though. As Michael Parenti says:

"For the rich lamas and lords, the Communist intervention was a calamity. Most of them fled abroad, as did the Dalai Lama himself, who was assisted in his flight by the CIA... throughout the 1960s, the Tibetan exile community was secretly pocketing $1.7 million a year from the CIA, according to documents released by the State Department in 1998. Once this fact was publicized, the Dalai Lama's organisation itself issued a statement admitting that it had received millions of dollars from the CIA during the 1960s to send armed squads of exiles into Tibet to undermine the Maoist revolution. The Dalai Lama's annual payment from the CIA was $186,000. Indian intelligence also financed both him and other Tibetan exiles. He has refused to say whether he or his brothers worked for the CIA. The agency has also declined to comment....Today, mostly through the National Endowment for Democracy and other conduits that are more respectable-sounding than the CIA, the US Congress continues to allocate an annual $2 million to Tibetans in India, with additional millions for 'democracy activities' within the Tibetan exile community."

1. Dalai Lama quoted in Donald Lopez Jr., Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1998), 205.

2. Erik D. Curren, Buddha's Not Smiling: Uncovering Corruption at the Heart of Tibetan Buddhism Today (Alaya Press 2005), 41.

3. Pradyumna P. Karan, The Changing Face of Tibet : The Impact of Chinese Communist Ideology on the Landscape (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1976), 64.

4. See Gary Wilson's report in Worker's World, 6 February 1997.

5. Gelder and Gelder, The Timely Rain, 62 and 174.

6. As skeptically noted by Lopez, Prisoners of Shangri-La, 9.

7. Melvyn Goldstein, William Siebenschuh, and Tashì-Tsering, The Struggle for Modern Tibet : The Autobiography of Tashì-Tsering (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

8. Gelder and Gelder, The Timely Rain, 110.

9. Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet 1913-1951 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 5 and passim.

10. Anna Louise Strong, Tibetan Interviews (Peking: New World Press, 1959), 15, 19-21, 24.

11. Quoted in Strong, Tibetan Interviews, 25.

12. Strong, Tibetan Interviews, 31.

13. Gelder and Gelder, The Timely Rain, 175-176; and Strong, Tibetan Interviews, 25-26.

14. Gelder and Gelder, The Timely Rain, 113.

15. A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet rev. ed. (Armonk, N.Y. and London: 1996), 9 and 7-33 for a general discussion of feudal Tibet; see also Felix Greene, A Curtain of Ignorance (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), 241-249; Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 3-5; and Lopez, Prisoners of Shangri-La, passim.

16. Strong, Tibetan Interviews, 91-96.

17. Waddell, Landon, O'Connor, and Chapman are quoted in Gelder and Gelder, The Timely Rain, 123-125.

18. Hugh Deane, "The Cold War in Tibet ,"?CovertAction Quarterly (Winter 1987).

19. George Ginsburg and Michael Mathos Communist China and Tibet (1964), quoted in Deane, "The Cold War in Tibet ." Deane notes that author Bina Roy reached a similar conclusion.

20. Tendzin Choegyal, "The Truth about Tibet ," Imprimis (publication of Hillsdale College , Michigan ), April 1999.

21. Karan, The Changing Face of Tibet , 52-53.

22. http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/story.html?id=303914db-3a63-423f-a295-8929b68d955c&p=1